By: Dionísio Babo Soares*
Timor-Leste’s ratification of the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) on 26 September 2024 was more than a formal adherence to an international treaty; it was a deliberate act of strategic positioning. Indeed, Timor-Leste became one of the early adopters, contributing to the milestone of over 60 ratifications by September 2025, paving the way for the agreement’s entry into force in January 2026. This move signals that Timor-Leste is not merely willing to comply with global environmental norms, but also intends to be part of shaping the governance frameworks that will determine access to the ocean’s shared resources for decades to come. The subsequent question is, how can this be translated into practice, especially in light of recent developments at COP30?
This is an early entry into what Young (2020) describes as institutional interplay, whereby smaller states aim to increase their influence by embedding their national priorities into multilateral regimes during their formative phases. In this way, Timor-Leste is utilizing the BBNJ process to secure both material benefits, such as access to marine genetic resources and technology transfer, as well as normative influence in how these resources are regulated. These gains resonate with COP30’s emphasis on ocean-based climate solutions.
The BBNJ Agreement addresses four critical areas: the equitable sharing of benefits from marine genetic resources (MGRs); the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) in the high seas; environmental impact assessments for high seas activities; and capacity building and technology transfer for developing states. For Timor-Leste, all four intersect with domestic priorities. MGRs represent an untapped opportunity in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and food industries. MPAs in the high seas could help sustain migratory fish stocks, such as tuna, which are crucial for food security and the livelihoods of coastal communities.
Environmental assessments can provide a buffer against exploitative activities in adjacent high seas zones that could damage Timor-Leste’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Moreover, capacity building, perhaps the most immediately tangible benefit, promises investment in scientific research, surveillance technology, and human capital, thereby filling gaps that would otherwise constrain maritime governance, aligning directly with COP30’s strengthened commitments to adaptation finance and ocean ambition for vulnerable nations.
These treaty-related benefits are not isolated from the country’s broader diplomatic efforts. Timor-Leste has sought to integrate ocean governance into its international identity by convening high-profile conferences that merge marine diplomacy with pressing development and climate issues. In May 2025, Dili hosted the Second International Conference on the Law of the Sea, which for the first time dedicated a specific track to the application of the BBNJ Agreement in the context of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Two months later, from July 21 to 23, it convened the International Conference on Climate Change, Human Rights, and Climate Justice, bringing together delegates from across the Pacific, Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
These events have served as both policy laboratories and coalition-building exercises, allowing Timor-Leste to refine its negotiating positions and forge alliances with similarly situated states, efforts that culminated in COP30’s outcomes, where SIDS like Timor-Leste successfully advocated for enhanced ocean integration in national climate plans, with 92% of updated NDCs now incorporating marine measures. Keohane and Nye’s (2021) contemporary elaboration of complex interdependence helps explain this diplomatic strategy: in a world where environmental, economic, and security issues are increasingly entangled, influence stems not solely from military or economic power, but from the ability to frame and connect topics in ways that resonate across multiple governance arenas, as seen in Brazil’s COP30 push for ocean-forest linkages.
Central to Timor-Leste’s climate diplomacy is the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), which has been embedded in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change since 1992 and has been constantly reinterpreted as global conditions change, including at COP30, where it underpinned new finance pledges for adaptation in SIDS. Roberts and Parks (2023) frame climate justice as structural equity, arguing that the fairness of climate governance depends on recognising historically embedded inequalities in both contributions to and capacities for addressing climate change. Timor-Leste’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is vanishingly small, at around 0.002%. However, the country faces existential threats from climate impacts, including sea-level rise that threatens coastal communities, more frequent droughts that disrupt agriculture, and coral bleaching that undermines fisheries, challenges highlighted by SIDS delegations at COP30 as requiring urgent, grant-based funding.
The economic paradox is stark. Over 80% of Timor-Leste’s state expenditure is financed by its Petroleum Fund, accrued mainly from the now-depleted Bayu-Undan gas field. Looking forward, the Greater Sunrise gas project has the potential to generate upwards of $50 billion in revenue. However, this economic lifeline sits uncomfortably alongside global decarbonisation imperatives, especially as COP30’s compromise deal sidestepped explicit fossil fuel phase-outs while boosting finance for transitions in developing states. President José Ramos-Horta has stated that Timor-Leste could consider halting fossil fuel development if compensated with $75–100 billion in climate-compatible financing, a figure that reflects the magnitude of the trade-off. For climate justice advocates, such a conditional offer raises a fundamental question: can the principle of CBDR be operationalised to allow states in Timor-Leste’s position to secure a fair transitional pathway without compromising global mitigation goals, particularly given COP30’s emphasis on tailored roadmaps for vulnerable economies?
This is where Okereke’s (2022) polycentric climate governance thesis becomes particularly relevant. The model advocates for governance distributed across multiple centres of authority, international organisations, regional bodies, national governments, and local communities, each contributing context-specific solutions toward shared objectives, a vision echoed in COP30’s initiatives for urban adaptation and nature-based capital mobilization, led by Brazil. In this framework, Timor-Leste’s reliance on petroleum can be acknowledged as a transitional reality, with international partnerships enabling the gradual build-out of renewable energy systems, investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, and diversification of the economy through blue economy sectors such as sustainable fisheries, marine ecotourism, and offshore renewable energy.
By leveraging its leadership role in BBNJ implementation, Timor-Leste can convert capacity-building obligations into foundational elements of a broader resilience strategy, further amplified by COP30’s ocean-focused commitments that bridge biodiversity and climate agendas. For instance, the ocean-monitoring infrastructure acquired under BBNJ-related programs could double as a coastal early-warning system for climate-induced hazards. This aligns with Clark and Holliday’s (2024) transitions in the ocean governance framework, which argues that integrating social justice principles into marine policy from the outset ensures that conservation does not exacerbate inequality, principles that gained traction at COP30 amid calls for equitable ocean protection in SIDS.
The convergence of ocean governance and climate justice also presents Timor-Leste with an opportunity to influence the normative environment of international negotiations, building on COP30’s small wins in finance and ocean ambition despite gaps in emissions cuts. While many SIDS and LDCs have argued for greater access to climate finance, few have been able to do so from the dual platform of being early BBNJ ratifiers and active conveners of related high-level forums. This positioning enhances Timor-Leste’s credibility as both a responsible steward of the global commons and a principled advocate for equitable development, especially as COP30 underscored the sidelining of small islands while delivering pledges to address their adaptation needs. The policy narrative emerging from Dili is that environmental stewardship and the right to development are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are mutually reinforcing when pursued through frameworks that acknowledge differentiated responsibilities and capacities, as Brazil’s presidency has reinforced.
In practice, this means advocating for climate finance that is predictable, grant-based rather than debt-creating, and accessible without onerous administrative hurdles. These demands saw partial success at COP30 with new funding mechanisms. It also means pushing for recognition in multilateral processes that transitional fossil fuel use, in specific contexts, is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s objectives if coupled with a clear and credible pathway toward eventual decarbonisation, amid the conference’s uneasy compromise on energy transitions. By grounding these positions in established theories of environmental governance and justice, Timor-Leste strengthens its case in the eyes of both allies and sceptics.
Ultimately, Timor-Leste’s approach illustrates how a small, resource-dependent state can transform structural vulnerabilities into strategic assets. Through early ratification of BBNJ, proactive hosting of international forums, and principled advocacy for climate justice, now bolstered by COP30’s ocean and finance outcomes, it demonstrates that influence in global environmental politics is not monopolised by the materially powerful. Young’s (2020) institutional interplay shows how shaping nascent regimes can yield long-term influence; Keohane and Nye (2021) illuminate how complex interdependence opens doors for agenda-setting by the normatively credible; Roberts and Parks (2023) remind us that structural equity must be embedded in climate governance; Okereke (2022) points to the value of polycentric approaches in accommodating differentiated pathways; and Clark and Holliday (2024) emphasise that just transitions must be designed into ocean governance from the start. Seen through this theoretical prism, Timor-Leste’s BBNJ and climate justice narratives are not parallel tracks but integrated components of a coherent grand strategy, further validated by COP30’s linkages between marine biodiversity and climate resilience.
The conclusion that emerges from Clark and Holliday’s framework is that embedding justice into the design of ocean governance regimes ensures that they can serve as engines of both environmental protection and socio-economic empowerment. For Timor-Leste, the task ahead is to translate this alignment of treaty commitments, diplomatic capital, and moral authority, enhanced by COP30’s SIDS-relevant pledges, into tangible benefits for its citizens, building a development model that is resilient, equitable, and deeply anchored in the stewardship of the global commons.
*This opinion is personal and does not bind the institution the writer is affiliated with. Note: footnote is with the writer.
