By: Dionísio Babo Soares*
In a recent interview marking the 50th anniversary of Timor-Leste’s unilateral declaration of independence, President José Ramos-Horta reiterated the need for a constitutional amendment to transform the current semi-presidential system into a fully presidential one. He argued that such a change would resolve the “duality of command” between the President and the Prime Minister and that a presidential model would strengthen executive authority, reducing potential institutional deadlocks. This proposal reactivates a long-standing debate, now revitalized by the upcoming 25th anniversary of the 2002 Constitution.
Although the Fundamental Law has, at many moments, proven effective, its weaknesses have become evident throughout successive political crises. In this article, I examine the proposal to transition to presidentialism by linking Timor-Leste’s experience with constitutional scholarship, analyzing the vulnerabilities of the current model, presenting theoretical premises that help explain these weaknesses, and assessing, with analytical caution, the feasibility and risks of such a transition.
The typology of Shugart and Carey, developed in their classic work Presidents and Assemblies (1992), is one of the foundational references in political science for classifying semi-presidential regimes, distinguishing them based on the actual distribution of powers between the President and the Prime Minister. According to this model, there are two main subtypes, including the president–parliamentary system, adopted by Timor-Leste in 2002, in which the President, directly elected, retains significant powers, including the appointment and possible dismissal of the Prime Minister and ministers, while the Government remains accountable both to the Head of State and to Parliament. This configuration creates two poles of democratic legitimacy within the executive, increasing the potential for political tensions, particularly under conditions of cohabitation, and finding historical parallels in countries such as France, Russia in the 1990s, and Mozambique before its constitutional revision.
In the examples commonly cited by Shugart and Carey, historical variations of the president–parliamentary model help illustrate its dynamics: in France, although the system is classically classified as “premier-presidential,” there were periods, especially in the early decades of the Fifth Republic and in certain phases of cohabitation, when the President exercised reinforced control over the appointment and stability of the Government, approaching the president–parliamentary logic; in Russia in the 1990s, the 1993 Constitution established a highly presidential executive, in which the President could appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister with limited parliamentary intervention, making the Government simultaneously accountable to the Head of State and to the State Duma — the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia and one of the country’s central legislative bodies; and in Mozambique, prior to the 2004 constitutional revision, the President likewise held broad powers to appoint and dismiss the Government without parliamentary validation, creating a dual line of political accountability, to the President and to the Assembly, that characterizes this subtype of semi-presidentialism.
This duality has generated recurrent tensions, particularly in contexts of cohabitation. The most illustrative episode occurred after the 2018 elections, when the coalition led by Xanana Gusmão obtained an absolute majority. President Francisco Guterres “Lu-Olo” vetoed nine ministerial appointments, blocking the complete formation of the Executive. Timor-Leste’s young democracy, still undergoing institutional consolidation, has shown vulnerability to this type of systemic conflict.
Constitutional scholarship has offered particularly sophisticated tools for interpreting the tensions inherent in semi-presidentialism, especially in models where two autonomous sources of democratic legitimacy coexist. Jorge Miranda, in his analysis of Portuguese constitutionalism after 1976, highlighted that coordination between the President of the Republic and the Government requires careful calibration of their respective powers to avoid institutional friction that could compromise governmental effectiveness. In turn, Gomes Canotilho and Vital Moreira, in their commentary on the Portuguese Constitution, systematized this conceptual evolution by classifying the Portuguese model as a “rationalized parliamentarism,” underscoring that the constitutional framers sought to reduce the structural conflict typical of semi-presidential systems through instruments of governmental stabilization, primarily parliamentary accountability mechanisms, and a deliberate weakening of the President’s interventionist powers in executive political direction. This interpretation, grounded in a sophisticated understanding of constitutional complexity, offers an analytical framework for comparative assessment of the different solutions states adopt to balance presidential authority, governmental responsibility, and institutional stability.
Although Portuguese constitutional doctrine does not directly address the Timorese experience, its theoretical framework provides handy tools for interpreting it. In semi-presidential systems that grant the President of the Republic reinforced powers in political direction and government formation, the likelihood of institutional friction increases when the party system is highly fragmented and when constitutional conventions are still consolidating, realities typical of post-conflict democracies. Through this conceptual lens, it becomes clear that Timor-Leste’s “duality of legitimacies” has not operated as a stabilizing mechanism but rather as a potential source of political deadlock, insofar as the absence of a culture of cooperation among sovereign organs and the volatility of parliamentary alliances have amplified the inherent tensions of the president–parliamentary model. Thus, the categories developed by Portuguese scholarship help explain why Timor-Leste’s constitutional order has produced recurrent episodes of interinstitutional conflict and why the debate on a potential constitutional revision assumes systemic relevance.
Beyond insights from constitutional doctrine, comparative political science offers relevant warnings for Timor-Leste’s institutional debate. Juan Linz, one of the most influential theorists of political regimes, emphasized that presidentialism in young democracies tends to face structural vulnerabilities stemming from the rigidity of mandates, the zero-sum logic of executive disputes, and the personalization of power.
Later, José Antonio Cheibub and Scott Mainwaring deepened this analysis by empirically demonstrating that in contexts of legislative fragmentation and weakly institutionalized party systems, presidentialism can amplify political crises rather than resolve them. From this theoretical framework, it becomes clear that replacing a semi-presidential model with a presidential system is not, in itself, a guarantee of governmental stability or institutional security.
Even so, it is important to recognize that the Timorese case presents its own characteristics that nuance this diagnosis: presidential figures enjoy exceptionally high levels of political and social legitimacy; and several crisis episodes since the restoration of independence resulted not from systemic weaknesses in Parliament or the parties, but precisely from the executive duality inherent in the current president–parliamentary model. These specificities place Timor-Leste in a distinctive position within the comparative literature, justifying a constitutional debate informed by both international scholarship and the country’s concrete historical experience.
Ramos-Horta’s Proposal in Light of Timor-Leste’s Experience
The position recently advanced by President José Ramos-Horta, advocating a transition to a presidential system, rests on the premise that concentrating executive authority in a single officeholder would clarify competencies and eliminate the grey areas that have fueled political crises since 2002. From a strictly constitutional viewpoint, the argument has internal coherence: a presidential model removes the need for cohabitation, eliminates competing legitimacies between the President and the Government, and establishes fixed mandates that may enhance governmental stability. Such an architecture could, in theory, strengthen the State’s capacity to implement structural public policies in economic development, administrative reform, local governance, and national reconciliation.
Timor-Leste is therefore confronted with a structural dilemma: maintaining a semi-presidentialism that, in practice, has produced recurrent conflicts due to executive duality; or evolving toward a more clearly presidential model, which, although capable of reducing ambiguities, requires an articulated set of safeguards to prevent the concentration of power. Timor-Leste’s experience shows that executive duality has not functioned as a balancing mechanism but as a source of obstruction. Comparative constitutional reflection, especially that produced in the Lusophone world and adapted to our historical context, helps illuminate these weaknesses. In contrast, comparative political science reminds us that presidentialism in young democracies carries inherent challenges. Thus, any reform must be technically calibrated to ensure that the pursuit of “clear authority” does not sacrifice the democratic pluralism and institutional balance that have been foundational to Timor-Leste’s constitutional order since 2002.
The prospect of a constitutional revision within the 2027–2028 horizon, intended to prepare a new institutional model ahead of the subsequent electoral cycle, demonstrates temporal prudence and political responsibility. President Ramos-Horta’s public statement that he does not intend to benefit from any eventual change personally reinforces the credibility of the proposal as a state reform, detached from individual power-maintenance strategies.
In sum, Timor-Leste is confronted with a structural dilemma: maintaining a semi-presidentialism that has repeatedly generated conflict due to executive duality, or shifting toward a clearer presidentialism, which, while reducing ambiguities, demands strong safeguards to prevent concentration of power. Timor-Leste’s experience shows that executive duality has operated as a source of deadlock rather than equilibrium. Comparative political science sheds light on these fragilities and reminds us that presidentialism in young democracies presents specific challenges. Therefore, any reform must be technically calibrated to ensure that the desire for “clear authority” does not undermine the democratic pluralism and institutional balance that have defined Timor-Leste’s constitutional order since 2002.
*This analysis is exclusively a personal opinion and intended for academic purposes, without binding the institutions the author represents.
