By: Dionísio Babo Soares
In the opening days of 2026, the United States launched a decisive military operation in Venezuela, culminating in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro on January 3. Many outside the U.S. claim this move is aimed at securing influence over the country’s resources, including its estimated 300 billion barrels of heavy crude oil reserves, as well as coal, gold, and nickel deposits. The intervention reflects an assertive reassertion of U.S. hemispheric dominance, particularly amid growing Russian and Chinese influence in Latin America.
It aligns with the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), which references the Monroe Doctrine (on pages 5 and 14) and emphasizes economic priorities over multilateral norms. Often described as a modern “Trump Corollary” to the historic Monroe Doctrine, this action raises key questions for many unfamiliar with the Monroe Doctrine: What is the Monroe Doctrine, and how does it apply to Venezuela’s turmoil and the rest of the world? Many observers have warned that this change in American politics signals a return to a traditional world order reminiscent of 19th-century great-power politics, where major actors carve out spheres of influence, subordinating international law to national interests.
First articulated in 1823 to deter European colonialism in the Americas, the Monroe Doctrine has evolved in the 21st century to counter contemporary rivals, most notably China. The Western Hemisphere remains viewed as the U.S. “backyard,” with China emerging as a key challenger through extensive loans and oil deals with Maduro’s regime. Since 2007, Beijing has provided over $60 billion in oil-backed financing, becoming Venezuela’s top creditor and buyer, with debts estimated at $10 to $19 billion often repaid through discounted crude shipments. The U.S. operation seeks to install a pro-Washington government, sever these ties, send a warning to other Latin American nations like Brazil and Colombia, and deepen relations with Beijing. This “neo-Monroism” frames Chinese investments as hostile encroachments, justifying unilateral steps to restore American primacy.
The intervention’s ripple effects extend across the region. Maduro’s ouster could economically isolate Cuba, a close Venezuelan ally and strategic partner for China near the U.S. border. Venezuela supplies subsidized oil to Cuba, sustaining its economy under U.S. sanctions; any cutoff might spark instability in Havana, echoing Cold War tensions like the Cuban Missile Crisis. With China’s growing trade and infrastructure ties in Cuba, Beijing could respond, potentially drawing U.S. countermeasures similar to Russia’s in Ukraine. Left-leaning regional powers, such as Brazil, might hesitate to step in, inadvertently boosting China’s influence and prompting Washington to adopt bolder stances. Overall, the maneuver strengthens U.S. leverage in Venezuela, weakens Cuban stability, curbs Chinese expansion indirectly, bolsters regional control, and could revive resource production to pre-Chávez eras within a decade, assuming stabilization.
However, this approach faces significant criticism. Justifications, including drug-trafficking charges from a New York court and claims of an “illegitimate government,” are seen as overriding Venezuelan sovereignty and the people’s democratic will. Observers argue that such unilateralism undermines the rules-based international order, prioritizing U.S. goals like fighting “narco-terrorists” and curbing migration. Critics warn of long-term pitfalls: Short-term gains in Venezuela may not yield lasting peace, as rivals like China and Russia exploit perceived U.S. overreach.
While Beijing has condemned the intervention and maintained strong multisectoral ties in Latin America for years, it has not explicitly vowed to defy the Monroe Doctrine outright. Instead, post-NSS publication in December 2025 and the Venezuela events, China appears poised to recalibrate its Americas strategy in a more hostile environment, avoiding confrontation while sustaining partnerships.
These developments highlight a shift not toward a wholly “new” world order but a return to traditional great-power dynamics, where might often trumps right. The 2025 NSS does not declare the end of U.S. global primacy but redefines it through “Flexible Realism,” prioritizing the Western Hemisphere while promoting burden-sharing with allies. It urges Europe and Asia’s “First Island Chain” nations to lead in their regions, allowing the U.S. to focus resources efficiently.
Far from advocating withdrawal, the strategy affirms a disciplined military and economic presence in the Indo-Pacific —identified on page 19 of NSS as a “key economic and geopolitical battleground” of the century — stating, “To thrive at home, we must successfully compete there, and we are.” This bipolar contest between the U.S. and China intensifies rivalry, marginalizes peripheries, and pressures small states, which may become proxies without strong alliances.
Small Asia Pacific countries, including Timor-Leste, starkly illustrate these vulnerabilities. As one of Southeast Asia’s youngest sovereign entities, with populations under a few million and poverty rates exceeding 40%, countries like Timor-Leste boast valuable offshore oil and gas reserves such as those in the Timor Sea, worth about $50 billion in potential revenue for Timor-Leste alone.
However, to these countries, their underdeveloped economies have drawn Chinese selective engagement via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In recent years, cooperation frameworks have been signed across the region, covering infrastructure, agriculture, and digital sectors. Projects like ports and irrigation systems have created jobs and improved connectivity, earning praise from leaders who dismiss “debt trap” fears and note that many initiatives are locally funded. Still, to neighbors like Australia and the U.S., this fosters dependency, despite China often emerging as a leading non-oil trade partner. As cooperation develops, the ties are upgraded to “comprehensive strategic partnerships.”
In this evolving order, U.S. hemispheric focus does not mean abandoning the Asia-Pacific; rather, it enables targeted countering of Chinese influence. Though outside the First Island Chain, the primary military shield in the Western Pacific, small Asia-Pacific countries, like Timor-Leste, remain in the Indo-Pacific, potentially serving as critical rear-support nodes. The NSS aims to keep such areas “aligned and open” for resource and maritime access to bolster frontline defenses.
However, with U.S. official development assistance (ODA) declining amid China’s infrastructure dominance, and these nations aspiring to regional memberships like ASEAN without major pacts, Western observers say they risk overreliance on Beijing. Neighbors like Indonesia and Australia worry about Chinese encroachments potentially militarizing the region, especially with openness to joint exercises with China.
Their strategic locations near key sea lanes raise the stakes: If China asserts dominance, will small Asia Pacific countries, including Timor-Leste, face pressures akin to Venezuela’s? Will these small states compromise sovereignty over assets like gas fields and turn to Beijing if Western support wanes? This “non-aligned” strategy — balancing multiple powers — may prove untenable in a multipolar world where small states have limited agency. Small nations must play smart or navigate these rivalries.
In conclusion, the U.S. intervention in Venezuela under a revived Monroe Doctrine heralds a precarious era for peripheral nations. Economic might and military boldness are reshaping sovereignty, endangering states clashing with great-power interests. For small Asia-Pacific countries, including Timor-Leste, intensifying U.S.-China rivalry in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where America maintains active competition, and China lacks equivalent hard-power projection, could heighten risks.
Multilateralism offers a path forward, as collective frameworks provide resilience against coercion. Without such countermeasures, this return to imperial-style contestation promises ongoing instability, with small states reduced to pawns in a high-stakes geopolitical game.
*The opinions expressed here reflect personal perspectives and are intended solely to stimulate academic debate. They do not represent the views of the entity with which the author is affiliated.
