Western Sahara: The End of MINURSO Cannot End the Right to Independence and Self-Determination
By: Felisberto de Carvalho and Dionisio Babo Soares*
The closure of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), following the Security Council’s failure to adopt a resolution on 30 October 2026, marks a troubling turning point in one of the world’s longest unresolved decolonisation processes. However, the termination of a United Nations mission cannot be equated with the termination of a people’s fundamental rights. For the Sahrawi people, the end of MINURSO represents a serious diplomatic setback, but it does not extinguish their right to self-determination or their legitimate aspiration to independence.
The Security Council’s failure exposed deep divisions among its permanent members. Russia vetoed a United States-drafted resolution that would have restructured MINURSO and made Morocco’s autonomy proposal under Moroccan sovereignty the exclusive basis for negotiations. A competing Russian proposal to extend the mission’s existing mandate also failed to secure sufficient support.
The resulting institutional vacuum raises concerns about regional stability, the protection of civilians and the future of international engagement. However, the more fundamental question is whether the international community remains committed to the principles of decolonisation or is gradually allowing political expediency to replace international legality.
Western Sahara remains on the United Nations list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. Its decolonisation has not been completed, and its people retain the internationally recognised right to determine their political status.
Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter establishes respect for the equal rights and self-determination of peoples as one of the Organisation’s fundamental purposes. General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 affirms the right of colonial peoples to independence and self-determination, while Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 reinforces the principle that peoples must be free to determine their political future without external interference.
The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion of 1975 provides further legal clarity. Although the Court recognised certain historical ties between Western Sahara and neighbouring political entities, it concluded that these did not establish territorial sovereignty that could override the right to self-determination.
These legal foundations remain relevant regardless of changing political circumstances. Neither the expiration of a peacekeeping mandate nor the diplomatic preferences of powerful governments can extinguish the Sahrawi people’s right to seek independence through a process consistent with international law.
The distinction is fundamental. Independence is not an illegitimate demand simply because it conflicts with another state’s territorial claims or strategic interests. It remains a recognised possibility within the international framework of decolonisation. Equally, the ultimate political status of Western Sahara must reflect the freely and genuinely expressed will of its people.
For this reason, any political proposal that excludes independence before the Sahrawi people have exercised their right to self-determination raises serious questions of legitimacy.
Morocco maintains that autonomy under its sovereignty offers a realistic solution capable of providing stability, development and local self-government. Supporters of that approach argue that decades of unsuccessful attempts to organise a referendum demonstrate the need for political pragmatism.
However, political pragmatism cannot replace the requirements of international law. A settlement may be administratively convenient, economically attractive or diplomatically acceptable to influential governments. Nevertheless, these considerations cannot substitute for the genuine consent of the people whose future is at stake.
The original referendum envisaged when MINURSO was established in 1991 was meant to give the Sahrawi people a choice between independence and integration with Morocco. Although disagreements over voter eligibility and political conditions prevented its implementation, that failure cannot justify removing the underlying right. A right does not cease to exist because those responsible for facilitating its exercise have failed to fulfil their commitments.
This is where the international community’s credibility faces a particularly difficult test. It also tests the capacity and seriousness of any secretary-general of the United Nations to uphold the standard Kofi Annan set in resolving the case of Timor-Leste.
Powerful states frequently proclaim their commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights and the rules-based international order. However, their positions on self-determination often seem to vary with strategic alliances, economic interests, and geopolitical priorities.
When the principle serves their interests, they defend it as fundamental. When it challenges their preferred political arrangements, they may subordinate it to stability, territorial considerations, or diplomatic convenience.
Such double standards weaken the moral authority of states that claim to defend universal principles. They also raise legitimate concerns about whether international law is being applied consistently or selectively interpreted to accommodate the interests of those exercising the greatest influence.
The convergence of strategic interests among powerful states can produce outcomes that progressively marginalise the rights and aspirations of less influential peoples. This does not necessarily establish a coordinated conspiracy, but it shows how collective political decisions, diplomatic pressure, and institutional inaction can produce consequences that resemble deliberate exclusion.
For the Sahrawi people, the danger is that prolonged international neglect may gradually normalise a situation that remains legally unresolved. What was initially presented as a temporary political impasse risks becoming an arrangement accepted over time rather than through the freely expressed consent of the people concerned.
This raises not only legal questions but also profound moral concerns. An international system that recognises a people’s rights in principle while repeatedly failing to create conditions for their exercise risks undermining the very standards upon which its legitimacy rests.
No state should be entitled to invoke international law when it advances its interests while disregarding the same principles when they become politically inconvenient. The credibility of powerful countries must be judged by their conduct, not merely by their declarations.
The case of Western Sahara illustrates the human consequences of this inconsistency. For decades, Sahrawi families have endured displacement, separation and uncertainty. Refugee communities near Tindouf, Algeria, remain dependent on humanitarian assistance, while generations of young people have grown up without a definitive political settlement.
For these communities, the right to self-determination is not an abstract legal doctrine. It concerns their identity, cultural heritage, connection to their homeland and capacity to determine their collective future.
The aspiration to independence reflects a profound desire for political agency, dignity and the opportunity to establish institutions that represent their own choices.
The international community must recognise that humanitarian assistance, however necessary, cannot replace political justice. Food, education and healthcare are essential to human survival, but they do not resolve the underlying question of a people’s right to determine its political status.
The closure of MINURSO therefore creates a new responsibility rather than ending an existing one.
The United Nations General Assembly, its Fourth Committee and the Special Committee on Decolonisation retain important responsibilities concerning Western Sahara. The African Union, international human rights organisations, and other relevant actors can also help keep the issue within international diplomatic and legal discussions.
A renewed political approach should preserve the right to independence as a legitimate option, encourage meaningful negotiations and establish credible mechanisms through which the Sahrawi people can freely express their will.
Such a process must include appropriate safeguards for refugees, meaningful participation by women and young people, protection of human rights and consideration of the territory’s natural resources.
The principle should remain clear: negotiations may determine the procedures and arrangements through which a settlement is reached, but they must not simply impose a predetermined political status upon the people concerned.
At the same time, the defence of self-determination must continue through peaceful, diplomatic, political and legal means. The termination of MINURSO should not lead to resignation, nor should frustration with international institutions undermine the possibility of a negotiated and peaceful settlement.
The Sahrawi people have legitimate reasons to feel disappointed by decades of unfulfilled international commitments. Their continued pursuit of self-determination, including the aspiration to independence, should nevertheless remain grounded in perseverance, political organisation, international solidarity and respect for human dignity.
Historical experience demonstrates that decolonisation has rarely proceeded without resistance, diplomatic obstacles or periods of international indifference. The persistence of these difficulties does not invalidate the rights of the peoples concerned.
What ultimately matters is whether the international community is prepared to transform its recognition of self-determination into an effective political process.
The Security Council’s failure on 30 October should therefore prompt serious reflection on the relationship between international power and international justice. The question is not simply whether MINURSO should have continued, but whether the institutions responsible for maintaining international peace are willing to uphold the Charter’s principles when doing so conflicts with the preferences of influential states.
Terminating a peacekeeping mission is an institutional decision. The right to self-determination is a continuing legal entitlement. Confusing the two would represent a serious misunderstanding of the foundations of the international order.
The Sahrawi people’s legitimate aspiration to independence deserves recognition and respect, just as their right to determine their political status must remain protected. Neither can be dismissed solely because the international community has failed to achieve a settlement.
The end of MINURSO may close one chapter in the United Nations’ engagement with Western Sahara. However, it cannot close the question of decolonisation or extinguish the Sahrawi people’s fundamental right to self-determination.
The real test of international legitimacy now lies in whether the United Nations and its Member States will continue to pursue a credible settlement that respects international law and the will of the Sahrawi people.
No veto, diplomatic deadlock or decision by a powerful state can lawfully deprive a people of its right to determine its own future. For the Sahrawi people, the aspiration to freedom and independence remains a legitimate part of that right, and they must ultimately decide their future.
Disclaimer: The authors are lecturers at the School of Politicas Publicas, the Faculty of Social and Political Science of the University of Timor-Leste (UNTL). This article is intended for a wider public readership, to encourage informed discussion and to contribute constructively to the search for a just, peaceful and lasting resolution of the question of Western Sahara, consistent with international law and the right of the Sahrawi people to self-determination.
